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Abstract: India has a decade-long experience with independent regulatory 
agencies in public services as an institutional transplant from the 
industrialized world. Introduced at the behest of international donor 
agencies, regulators in India are intended, somewhat naively, to provide an 
apolitical space for decision making to assuage investor concerns over 
arbitrary administrative actions, and thereby stimulate private investment. 
In practice, regulators have had to negotiate a terrain over which the state 
has continued to exercise considerable control. Regulators have also been 
been shaped in their functioning by national and sub-national political 
traditions and by administrative and political practices. The result is a 
hybrid institutional form that combines politics as usual with intriguing 
new, and unanticipated, opportunities for political intervention. 
This paper will explore the origins of electricity regulation as a form of 
institutional “isomorphism.” It will then compare the regulatory 
experience in India's electricity sector across two Indian states to 
understand the implications of transplanting regulatory agencies in the 
global south.  An examination of the process through which regulatory 
decisions are reached illustrates how existing bureaucratic and 
technocratic networks, transplanted procedures, and administrative 
cultures combine to conservatively manage long-standing political 
tensions around electricity. In seeking to manage those tensions, regulators 
often take decisions – on tariff setting, for example – based on a political 
reading that belies the technocratic narrative on which institutional 
credibility rests. At the same time, civil society groups ranging from 
residential associations to professional associations to individuals are 
using newly created regulatory spaces to structure a more deliberative 
decision process. 
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INSTITUTIONAL TRANSPLANT AS POLITICAL 
OPPORTUNITY: THE PRACTICE AND POLITICS OF 
INDIAN ELECTRICITY REGULATION 
 




Independent regulatory agencies have entered India through the back-door, 
little remarked upon and even less understood. Proponents of regulatory 
bodies – notably donor agencies – view the mechanism as a way to 
insulate politics from decision making. Insiders to Indian government and 
administration, notably including some regulators and regulated, dismiss 
regulatory bodies as one more layer of government, barely distinguishable 
from preceding layers. In this paper, I suggest that regulation in India has 
certainly not fulfilled the naïve expectations of the designers, but that it 
has led to a process of re-making governance in India, opening doors to 
the construction of regulation as a new democratic space. My aim in this 
paper is to map out the contours of an emergent politics of regulation in 
India by looking at the case of electricity regulation.  
By looking at India I also intend to contribute to what is currently a very 
thin literature on regulation in practice in the developing world, with the 
possible exception of Latin America. There are good reasons to believe 
that regulation in developing countries will have distinct features from that 
in either the United States, or the emergent regulatory state in Europe. 
Common features that shape regulatory outcomes in developing countries 
include the greater presence and authority of external actors, particularly 
donors, as vectors of policy transfer, the importance of consultants as 
knowledge carriers and as implementers, the overbearing but 
paradoxically also weak state, and the propensity for thin state legitimacy. 
From a practical perspective, states in the developing world are self-
consciously re-orienting themselves toward forms of steering over 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, Centre for the Study of Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru 
University, New Delhi. 
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ownership, without much reflection on whether and how this shift changes 
the nature of politics and concerns of democratic legitimacy and 
accountability. In the conclusion I reflect on some of these broader 
concerns that relate to regulation in the developing world. 
My point of entry to regulation in India is the electricity sector. As a 
leading concern of economic reformers for over a decade, electricity is a 
good example of efforts to re-make a state-owned and controlled sector 
around the new vision of private ownership and arms-length regulation. In 
addition, electricity regulators in India have been established at the state 
level, allowing for comparison of different states with different political 
and other conditions, but within the same larger administrative culture and 
legal traditions. In this paper I examine electricity regulation in Andhra 
Pradesh, a state with a reputation as a successful reformer, and in Delhi, an 
early example of an effort to privatize electricity.  My approach is 
considerably informed by Hancher and Moran's (1989) device of a 
“regulatory space,” which seeks to focus attention on the institutional and 
political specificities of particular regulatory contexts. 
The paper is divided into three sections. I begin with an exploration of 
how the establishment of Indian electricity regulators can be explained 
through sociological theories of institutional isomorphism. The next 
section turns to the two cases, Andhra Pradesh and Delhi, to examine both 
the macro- and micro-politics of regulatory agencies. A third section 
explores whether and how newly established regulatory agencies provide 
new spaces for democratic politics. I end with a concluding section that 
sketches the contours of regulatory space for Indian electricity, by drawing 
on the insights gained from the two cases. 
 
II. “ISOMORPHISM” IN INDIAN ELECTRICITY 
REGULATION 
 
The creation of independent regulatory agencies is often understood within 
the framework of a problem of delegation. Under what conditions, and 
why, would a government choose to delegate authority to an independent 
“non-majoritarian” body? Recent work suggests that a principal-agent 




framing of the problem of regulatory establishment is incomplete without 
attention to a more sociological understanding of regulatory origins.1 In 
this section, I lay out an explanation for the origins of Indian electricity 
regulation based on processes of institutional isomorphism, with attention 
to how regulators have become a way of signaling legitimacy within a 
larger project of restructuring and reform.  
 
A. THE TANGLED LEGACY OF INDIAN ELECTRICITY 
Electricity is a “concurrent” subject under India’s constitution, which 
places it under both central government and state government control.2 In 
1948, the sector was organized around state-level, publicly owned and 
controlled State Electricity Boards (SEBs).  SEBs were crafted in the 
crucible of post-independence India, and strongly shaped by the idea that 
electricity was a tangible and realizable benefit that the state could 
demonstrate to its citizens as a gain from achieving independence. In 
particular, SEBs had a dual nature as commercial entities and as 
instruments of development policy.  
Since the SEBs effectively operated as extensions of the state Energy 
Ministries, they have been prey to a range of garden-variety, but crippling, 
problems of government in India. These span everything from internal 
markets for staff promotion and placement, to graft for non-payment of 
bills, to incorporation into the election financing apparatus.  
Over time, the political fault lines in the sector have crystallized around 
three issues: farmers hanging on to populist subsidies, industrialists 
rebelling against the higher tariffs needed to support those subsidies, and 
increasingly affluent and mobilized urban consumers demanding better 
service.  Meanwhile, finance ministries at state and central levels, backed 
by international donors, have given notice that budgetary subsidies to the 
sector must come to an end.  By the early 1990s these oppositional forces 
had become clear; by the late 1990s they were crippling the performance 
of the sector. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Thatcher and Stone-Sweet (2002), and Gilardi (2004). 
2 This section draws on Dubash and Rajan (2000), which reviews the recent political 
economy of India’s electricity sector.  
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State-level independent electricity regulatory commissions have been 
placed in the unenviable position of untangling these knots. In India, 
regulators have been created at both central and state levels, with the 
central regulator responsible for interstate issues, and state regulators –
with which I am concerned in this paper -- responsible for critical 
regulatory functions at the state level including tariff setting, establishing 
operating regulations and monitoring the sector.  
 
B. ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING AS A “RATIONALIZED MYTH” 
The steady decline of India’s electricity sector during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s was coincident with a shift of seismic proportions in the 
global conventional wisdom around how best to organize the electricity 
sector. Electricity “restructuring” prescribes a transformation of publicly 
owned and managed monopoly electricity sectors into “unbundled” 
entities, subsequent privatization, and the introduction of competition 
between the newly created unbundled entities.3 Through the 1990s, this 
prescription, which originated in the UK and Chile, coalesced into a 
standard prescription for electricity sector reform, independent of national 
context. There is certainly some indication that the implications of this 
approach were inadequately thought through for sectors in countries such 
as India, where bread and butter management reforms were, and remain, 
arguably more important than a restructuring around competitive markets.  
Independent regulatory agencies are an important piece of the larger 
restructuring prescription.  In functional terms, they are intended to 
provide the means of regulating the residual monopoly segment of the 
“unbundled” electricity sector (the wires), establish and enforce the rules 
of market functioning, and set tariffs in the lead-up to competitive 
markets. Most significant, however, they are intended to excise politically 
determined, and therefore arbitrary, decision processes and replace them 
with technocratic, and hence predictable, decisions. 
The quest for finances was an important part of the larger political context 
for the rapid rise of electricity restructuring. Emerging at a time of a larger 
global ideological shift toward the virtues of private investment, electricity 
                                                 
3 Patterson (1999) provides a very readable introduction to the topic. Dubash and Singh 
(2005) critically review these ideas and locate the debate in Indian context. 




restructuring became the accepted precondition for attracting foreign 
investment.  
Electricity restructuring, then, fits well Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) 
description of rationalized myths as “rationalized and impersonal 
prescriptions that identify various social purposes as technical ones and 
specify in a rulelike way the appropriate means to pursue these technical 
purposes rationally.”  Conformance to the restructuring agenda signaled 
seriousness and leant legitimacy to electricity policy reform.  
 
C. “ISOMORPHISM” IN THE INTRODUCTION OF INDEPENDENT 
REGULATORS  
The World Bank served as the dominant vector for transmission of the 
restructuring ideas to India. A 1993 policy statement made further lending 
for developing country electricity sectors conditional on progress toward a 
set of policies that included greater private sector involvement and 
establishment of independent regulators.  As the policy put it: “…the Bank 
will require countries to set up transparent regulatory processes that are 
clearly independent of power suppliers and that avoid government 
interference in day-to-day power company operations” (World Bank 1993, 
p. 14).4  
In the year the policy was issued, 1993, the World Bank brought that 
policy to India and explicitly invited states to take up the bargain. Five 
states initiated discussion, but only one state, Orissa, saw the process 
through in the form of corporatization, privatization, tariff reform and 
independent regulation (World Bank 1996). In its own statements, the 
World Bank clearly articulated the role of the regulator: “...to ensure the 
sustainability of tariff reform... inter alia to attract sufficient private 
investment and protect the interests of consumers” (World Bank 1996, 
p.7). A key contribution of the regulator to achieving these goals was “...to 
insulate Orissa's power sector from the government and ensure it’s ... 
                                                 
4 The other conditions -- commercialisation and corporatisation, importation of services, 
and encouragement of private investment – would soon become intertwined with the 
emergent model of competitive electricity markets emanating from the UK, to become a 
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autonomy” (World Bank 1996, Annex 5.3, p. 2). In other words, the 
fundamental purpose of electricity regulation was to create an apolitical 
space for electricity decision, in large part to send a signal of credibility to 
investors.5 
An army of donor funded consultants descended on Orissa to elaborate 
and assist implementation of this template, in a suggestion of what Powell 
and DiMaggio might label “normative isomorphism” associated with the 
entrenchment of a professional field. While donor and consultant led, the 
reforms could not fairly be described as entirely coerced; a substantial 
component of the political leadership and bureaucracy, including the then-
Chief Minister, supported a fundamental reform orientation. However, the 
role or value of independent regulation among these domestic “reformers” 
was not clear. In the opinion of an Indian consultant involved in the 
process, many officials saw regulation as a requirement of funding 
institutions or as a relatively costless diversionary tactic to signal 
seriousness about reform. 
This narrative partially supports a view of the World Bank as an 
instrument of “coercive isomorphism” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991), 
transmitting both the regulatory form as a rationalized institution, and 
providing the motivation for adoption in the form of withdrawal of 
financing support in the case of non-compliance. It also suggests a role for 
consultants, notably of foreign origin, as agents of “normative 
isomorphism” through their professional status, which enabled them to 
confer legitimacy in the realm of electricity restructuring. However, as 
suggested above, there was also an element of willing adoption in the 
interests of buying and signaling legitimacy by state decision-makers, but 
only based on a larger perception that adoption of the model would make 
little difference to decisions on the ground. I return to this “decoupling” 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977) between institutional structures and work 
activities in a later section. 
                                                 
5The goal of insulation from political process led to interesting design debates. According 
to Indian consultants, foreign consultants were naïve about how to achieve this outcome. 
For example, it was at the insistence of Indian consultants that the Orissa reform act 
explicitly prohibited elected officials from ever assuming office as a regulator. 





D. REGULATION EXTENDED: THE CENTRAL ACTS AND “MIMETIC 
ISOMORPHISM” 
The Orissa regulatory experiment was well short of being declared a 
success in its early years. In brief, regulatory “independence” quickly 
proved a double-edged sword: while the World Bank and state reformers 
expected the regulator to rapidly raise tariffs, the regulator instead decided 
that the public should not bear the burden of past mismanagement and 
decided on only a moderate increase.  Regulatory attention to the political 
fall-out of tariff increases, while understandable and perhaps necessary, 
was certainly not what the original framers of Orissa’s regulation were 
hoping for. Thus while the Orissa effort could have justifiably been read as 
the shifting of political contestation to a new political arena – the regulator 
– it was instead read as a less-than-desirable outcome driven by the 
idiosyncrasies of the individual regulators.  
Despite these overtones of failure, at least with regard to the regulator’s 
ability to signal credibility to investors, the Orissa approach to regulation 
has rapidly spread to other states. With state after state initiating plans for 
establishment of regulators – in most cases without the intervention of an 
external actor such as the World Bank -- the central government was faced 
with a possible proliferation of state acts under which regulatory bodies 
would be established. To provide some uniformity, the central (i.e. 
federal) government passed a central Electricity Regulatory Commissions 
Act (1998) to provide an alternative legal basis for state regulators, which 
was substantially based on the Orissa Act. Despite the Orissa experience 
to the contrary, the underlying presumption that it is indeed feasible to 
create an apolitical regulatory sphere simply by legislating one, was 
retained more or less intact.   
In 2003, as part of a more comprehensive move toward an electricity 
sector based on competition, a national Electricity Act (2003) was passed, 
which embedded electricity regulators within a larger project of transition 
toward a competitive electricity market. The Electricity Act endowed 
regulators with a range of responsibilities including tariff setting, issuance 
of licenses, definition and enforcement of standards, promotion of 
renewable energy, and advisory functions with regard to competition and 
investment. The Act represented a culmination of a trend starting with 
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Orissa, of devolving substantial powers away from the executive and 
toward regulators.   
The rapid proliferation of independent electricity regulators across India 
and sanctioned by central legislation suggests isomorphism in a “mimetic” 
vein, an attempt to derive legitimacy in a context of uncertainty 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991). That regulators proliferated even in the 
absence of any robust assessment of effectiveness, and in the face of a 
perception of early regulatory ineffectiveness, suggests that legitimacy 
derives less from effectiveness in outcome, than in a relatively impervious 
ratonalising myth around regulation.   
 
III. FROM STRUCTURE TO PRACTICE: 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND THE EFFECTS OF 
“DECOUPLING” 
 
As Meyer and Rowan suggest, conformity with institutionalized myths can 
lead to gaps between institutional structure and ongoing practice, or a 
process of “decoupling.”  In this section I explore this decoupling effect by 
examining the practice of regulation in two of India’s state: Andhra 
Pradesh (AP) and Delhi. In order to do so, however, it is necessary to 
explore the larger political context within which regulators are embedded.6 
Recall that the kernel of the regulatory role, that which lends it 
legitimizing potential, is the purported ability to insulate from politics.  
Accordingly, I begin this section with a discussion of how regulation is 
shaped by the “macro-politics” in each state, before turning to the “micro-
politics” of regulatory decision-making.  
                                                 
6 Thatcher and Stone-Sweet (2002) draw attention to institutional context, particularly 
political leadership, as factors that mediate the pressure to delegate. While I emphasize 
the intentional delegation process somewhat less than do they, their reminder of the larger 
context is nonetheless significant. 





A. MACRO-POLITICS: THE DOMINANCE OF POLITICS AS USUAL 
The larger context for electricity reform in India, and AP and Delhi are no 
exception, is the requirement for seismic, rather than incremental, change, 
along with an associated re-sorting of winners and losers. Not surprisingly, 
under these conditions, the extent of delegation of authority from 
governments to regulators, in practice, is limited. 
Andhra Pradesh (AP) is widely considered the one case that bucks the 
general perception that politicians lack the “political will” for reform. At 
the time the regulator was established in 1999, the Chief Minister, Mr. 
Naidu, was firmly established as the leading light among state-level 
economic reformers and was heavily backed by the World Bank. Indeed, 
Andhra Pradesh rapidly became the poster child of reform for donor 
agencies. 
At the time of reform, Andhra Pradesh faced a by-now familiar set of 
problems: high loss levels; abysmal monitoring of electricity use; threat of 
industrial flight from the grid; a work force potentially implicated in rent-
seeking; and weak and declining infrastructure quality. The context for 
reforms, including creation of a regulator, was one of stimulating and 
guiding a dramatic change in the sector. The solution devised by the 
consultants but endorsed, and vigourously so, by Naidu, rested on 
privatization of the sector and the introduction of competition as a 
necessary end.  
As a prelude to privatization, the state owned system was subjected to 
bread and butter management improvements, such as new and improved 
monitoring systems, re-aligning staff incentives around performance, and 
striking a wage for results deal with labour. These measures were actively 
supported by the political leadership, symbolized by weekly meetings held 
between Mr. Naidu and the top management of the electricity utility, and 
yielded impressive results in terms of a turn-around in key outcome 
indicators. 
However, the privatization effort was placed on hold, because of 
apprehensions that it would be politically unpopular in the 2004 state 
election, and because other state experiences – Delhi and Orissa – had 
 
 
10                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 06 
 
garnered unfavourable publicity. In 2004, Mr. Naidu nonetheless lost the 
election, and privatization disappeared off the road map entirely.7 
Regulation was, therefore, a necessary element in the reform scheme, but 
by no means the lynchpin.  Indeed, Naidu viewed the regulator’s role in 
quite circumscribed terms as being limited until competition began. By 
contrast to Orissa, where the state government was supportive but stepped 
back after the regulator was established, in AP the government was 
driving the implementation of reforms. Hence the regulator faced a less 
stern test; it did not have to be a gatekeeper against its own creators to 
nearly the same extent. Moreover, the responsibility for stewarding change 
did not lie with the regulator, but instead with the government, acting 
through the state utility. In Mr. Naidu’s words, “government has to go for 
reform, not the regulator.”8  
The Delhi experience, by contrast, has entirely been dominated by the 
larger context of a high profile privatization in Delhi. Following the 
experience of Orissa, widely viewed as a failure, Delhi's attempt at 
privatization was a high stakes effort to get it right. The pressure has been 
enormous; failure in Delhi would reinforce a signal that privatization in 
Indian electricity is a hopeless cause, and cause investors to be even more 
wary of entering the country's electricity sector.  
As in other states, the central objective of reform was to lower technical 
and, more important, commercial loss levels that together hovered above 
50%, and to improve service quality. The context within which the 
regulator was set was one of rapid and dramatic sectoral reform and 
change.  
The privatization arrangements constructed by the government constrained 
the regulator in several ways. The regulator lost control over many of the 
standard regulatory tools:  performance targets, the rate of return, and the 
ability to link tariffs and economic performance. Underlying this 
arrangement was a perceived need by the Delhi government for stability 
and predictability, especially in tariff setting, in order to reassure new 
private investors. The Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (DERC) 
vigorously protested the government’s policy directive circumscribing its 
role, but to no avail. Ultimately, the Delhi regulator began its work with a 
                                                 
7Interview with consultant involved in AP reforms, 3/5/06. 
8 Interview with Mr. Naidu, former Chief Minister of AP, Hyderabad, 1/6/06. 




somewhat contentious relationship with the government, a shortened list 
of instruments with which to do its work, minimal experience and 
capacity, a highly charged political context, and two very powerful and 
sophisticated private companies to regulate. 
In quite different ways, therefore, the two state experiences suggest that 
delegation to independent regulators as a means of “credible commitment” 
has little resonance. In AP, the government retained substantial control 
over decisions. In Delhi, while the government was far clearer about 
boundaries, and formally delegated some responsibilities, it did so within a 
highly truncated “zone of discretion” (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002).  
 
B. MICRO-POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONAL DECOUPLING 
If governments substantially retain control, how is the rationalizing myth 
of a technocratic regulator that ensures political insulation maintained? I 
suggest the answer lies in a better understanding of the micro-politics of 
regulation, and manner in which it facilitates decoupling of structure from 
outcome. 
Three networks shape the internal organizational space of Indian 
electricity regulators: the Indian Administrative Service – the elite 
governmental bureaucracy, the technical electricity fraternity, and 
consulting firms.  The combination of and balance between these three 
networks to a considerable extent shapes how the regulator mediates 
relationships with the government. 
The IAS is a ubiquitous presence in electricity regulators; in 2003, ten of 
twenty one electricity regulators were drawn from the IAS (Prayas 2003). 
Dense IAS networks facilitate informal consultation and back-room 
decision.  In addition, regulatory independence from the executive is 
challenging to pull off if regulators themselves come from a career 
administering political decisions. This tension is exacerbated when 
regulators are appointed directly from senior governmental positions, 
requiring them to shift, virtually over-night, from administering and 
defending government positions, to acting as an impartial referee. While it 
is by no means necessary that these pressures are entirely determinative, it 
is quite likely that the predominance of individuals from an IAS 
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background curtail the space for emergence of a new and distinct 
regulatory culture.  
The technical fraternity of India’s public electricity utilities constitutes the 
second network that shapes the regulatory space. Emerging from over fifty 
years of state ownership, employees of state owned electricity utilities 
constitute the only available pool for staff, and for regulators with 
technical expertise. The dependence on public employees is reinforced by 
the regulator’s human resource rules, which closely follow government 
scales and promotion criteria. The heavy representation of the technical 
fraternity within electricity regulators reinforces the image of the regulator 
as minimally distinct from the government. Finally, with a background 
operating within vertically integrated monopoly utilities, regulatory staff 
brings little knowledge of regulatory practice, let alone new trends in the 
organization of electricity such as introduction of competition and 
markets, ostensibly the rationale for transformation of the sector.  
This shortfall is made up by consultants, who play a substantial role in 
regulation and constitute the third network that shapes regulation. 
Consultants are in many ways the intellectual change agents, and play the 
key role in translating broad policy directions into specific policy 
measures. The intellectual positions that inform consultants are informed 
by their typical background as recent business school graduates, with a 
smattering of ex-public sector employees, and are further developed and 
propagated through broader consultant networks. 
Within the Andhra Pradesh regulator, decisions are shaped by interaction 
within the three components of regulators dominated by an IAS 
perspective, staff and consultants. Regulators use judicial metaphors to 
describe internal interactions.  Consultants often prepare base materials on 
the request of the Commission, particularly on new policy matters such as 
performance based regulation. Commissioners then listen to the range of 
arguments before making a decision. Staff is often seen as representing the 
consumers’ point of view and indeed, there is a separate section in each 
tariff order prepared exclusively by staff, independent from the 
Commission, which lays out a critical public perspective. Consultants 
typically represent and argue the “reform” view, which hews closely to the 
restructuring formula. Thus, the internal process appears to rest on 
dialogue, but ultimately filtered through an IAS perspective. 




The manner in which these internal arrangements lead to a form of 
institutional “decoupling” that allows the regulator to maintain a 
technocratic fiction is illustrated by an example of tariff setting. 
The Andhra Pradesh regulator is statutorily empowered to independently 
set tariffs. In theory, this should be done by simply setting tariff to meet 
the revenue requirement of the utilities based on a given rate of return. 
Indeed, in its first year, the regulator had applied such a formula, leading 
to a steep tariff hike, which in turn led to substantial protests. In 
subsequent years, there are good indications that the regulator has been 
more circumspect, balancing the political realities of tariff hikes, the 
budget available for subsidies, and the requirements of financial health for 
the utilities.9 Specifically, the regulator has taken to setting an efficiency 
based “performance target” for the utilities to meet, which in many years 
obviates the need for a tariff increase. Doing so brings obvious political 
benefits to the government. In other words, the AP regulator has devised a 
means of side-stepping the straitjacket of technocratic procedure, even 
while framing its intervention – an efficiency enhancing performance 
target – within the larger narrative of technocratic decision-making, 
thereby facilitating a perception of regulatory independence from politics. 
Note that this approach is facilitated only because management reforms 
introduced by the AP government have provided the utility a reasonable 
amount of financial space. This space has allowed the regulator to play its 
balancing role without having to substantially transgress boundaries of 
either political or economic acceptability. 
The Delhi case provides a similar example of decoupling, despite the more 
clearly articulated delegation enshrined in the privatization agreement.  In 
one tariff setting exercise, a straight accounting of costs, returns and 
revenues would have required the regulator to approve a massive 35% 
tariff increase. A hike of this scale would have been politically ruinous, 
particularly given a public perception that some of the private companies 
were failing to deliver on promises of service improvements. In response, 
the regulator, working with consultants, came up with the idea of creating 
a “regulatory asset” which allowed the tariff hike to be spread over future 
years. In subsequent years, a more modest 10% tariff hike led to public 
protest and an eventual roll-back of the tariff, confirming the regulator’s 
political judgement.  
                                                 
9Interview with APERC staff, 26/5/06. 
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Both these examples suggest that far from apolitical and technocratic 
regulation, Indian electricity regulators actively consider the political 
implications of their decisions, and, in order to accommodate politics, find 
creative ways of decoupling their decisions from the technocratic 
moorings of their institutional structures. 
 
IV. A NEW POLITICS OF REGULATION? 
 
The de-coupling of regulatory structure from practice potentially opens 
interesting and creative new spaces for politics around electricity.10 With 
the presumption of one, correct, technocratic answer to regulatory 
decisions set aside, the door is left open for independent regulatory 
agencies to become new sites of politics around electricity. That these 
politics may potentially, at least, have a potential democratic nature is 
made possible by the enshrining in electricity regulators of administrative 
law procedures around transparency, participation, and recourse.11 In this 
section, I examine to what extent and how regulators have functioned as 
sites for democratic politics in AP and Delhi. 
In AP, the regulator has established a procedural framework enabling 
access to information about the sector, a required process of public 
hearings in particular for tariff orders, and a mechanism for filing petitions 
and pleadings. For example, the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory 
Commission (APERC) has a well functioning and useful website, 
diligently holds hearings that are well attended, including in locations 
                                                 
10 In his discussion of the rise of the regulatory state in Europe, Majone (1994) makes the 
point that procedural safeguards, such as public hearings, are an important part of 
building the legitimacy of a regulatory state. Prosser (1999) has perhaps developed this 
argument the farthest in his work on public utilities in the UK, elegantly arguing not only 
for procedural safeguards, but a form of reflexive proceduralism that examines the 
conditions under which participation provides necessary safeguards and regulatory 
legitimacy. Lodge (2004) catalogues and provides critical reflection on the instruments 
through which transparency and accountability can be facilitated, while Hira et. al. (2005) 
for an interesting cross-country empirical comparison of procedural measures in use in 
electricity regulation. See, also, Nakhooda, Dixit and Dubash (2007) for an attempt to 
develop and test indicators of regulatory governance across countries. 
11 I discuss the genesis of these procedures elsewhere (Dubash, 2008). 




outside the capital city, has translated regulatory materials into the local 
language, and has established an Advisory Committee including labor, 
agricultural and consumer representatives. All of these procedural changes 
constitute a sea change from the entirely non-transparent closed decision-
making process under the pre-reform regime. 
There remain, of course, some substantial holes in full implementation of 
the spirit of these procedures. For example, in one case the APERC 
convened a hearing on an issue only after substantial external pressure, 
and once it did so, issued a sixty page order the very next day, which 
clearly could not have incorporated insights from the hearing process 
(Electricity Governance Initiative – India, 2006). In addition, there remain 
grey areas on information disclosure, such as on investment plans, where 
the APERC has no clear policy and procedure, and by default withholds 
access to these materials.12 Hesitation and confusion on such matters has a 
great deal to do with the newness of the institution and its staffing by 
individuals who bring parochial and paternalistic attitudes characterized 
by former monopoly state utilities.  There is little doubt, however, that 
under external pressure, the institutional space for regulatory governance 
is slowly but certainly becoming more open. 
Regulatory procedures on information and participation have expanded the 
regulatory space in AP, to include labor groups, political parties, consumer 
groups, individual consumers, industry associations, farmers, and other 
public bodies such as municipalities. A scan of the tariff order for 2006-07 
suggests that these opportunities are, in fact utilized. A total of 46 different 
individuals or institutions filed a total of 330 objections to the tariff orders 
of the three distribution companies in the state.13 Of these, 302 were 
“substantive” pertaining to issues that had to do with details of the tariff 
process, as compared to 28 “grievances” that were related to more narrow 
concerns that affected only the complainant or contained little or no 
substantive argumentation.  Not surprisingly the largest number, 106, were 
by individual consumers, but substantial numbers of comments, in each 
case between 25 and 70, were filed by political parties (42), public entities 
                                                 
12 This observation is based on a personal visit, during which the authors were allowed to 
open and view files on investment plans on the premises, but only after initial denial 
followed by a personal appeal to the Chairperson.  
13 Based on analysis conducted by the authors using data from tariff orders supplemented 
with information from APERC. This analysis excludes local language petitions, which 
are currently being translated. 
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(28), industry (36), unions (68) and consumer organizations (43). 
Interestingly industrial buyers and others with deep pockets are not 
disproportionately represented in these comments. 
While in some cases the comments reflect only a basic knowledge of the 
electricity sector and a nascent understanding of regulatory process, a 
handful of consistent interveners have won the respect of the Commission, 
being described as “almost equivalent to Commission staff in caliber”.14  
These regular and respected interveners are almost all from consumer 
groups, in some cases are individuals, rather than from industrial groups. 
Indeed, the latter were dismissed as narrow and parochial in their 
comments, rather than focusing on issues in a broader public interest. 
Respondents at the utility also express enthusiasm for consumer 
involvement, particularly in scrutinizing power purchase costs, which 
directly affect their own bottom line.  
The flurry of public engagement stimulated by creation of the APERC has 
begun to re-shape regulatory politics at three levels. First, consumer 
groups have actively worked to broaden and deepen the procedural rules. 
For example, they have demanded hearings at district levels, requested and 
won local language translation of orders, and forced broader and 
transparent review of power purchase agreements. 
Second, they have somewhat disrupted and injected themselves into the 
triangular negotiation between APERC, the Government and the utility. 
The main avenue for doing so is forcing release of information, and 
forcing public, documented, responses to raised objections, thereby 
limiting the extent to which adjustments in key parameters can be made 
behind the scenes. For example, farmer and consumer groups sought 
release of the agricultural census to measure rural power use conducted by 
the APERC. They have also sought and obtained public disclosure of the 
dispatch order of generating plants to ensure that one generator is not 
unfairly favoured over another. 
Finally, they have achieved some substantive gains, most significantly in 
the area of power purchase and approval of new generating plant 
investment, which accounts for the majority of total electricity cost.15 
Significantly, this is truly a public interest issue, as savings in power cost 
                                                 
14 Interview with APERC, 2/5/06. 
15Interview with senior management of APTransco, 19/5/06. 




accrue to all consumers, and cannot be captured by any single group. 
Gains in power purchase were achieved by forcing open the issue for 
debate before the regulator. In addition to arguments made by consumer 
groups, the resultant opportunities allow powerful actors such as the utility 
(for whom lower costs mean healthier finances) to pursue the issue to a 
greater extent than they otherwise would have. Indeed, in one case the 
process has led to strange bedfellows, with a petition jointly filed by the 
utility, the Peoples Monitoring Group on Electricity Regulation, and a 
journalist with Communist Party affiliation acting in his individual 
capacity. The expanded scope of regulatory governance has created new 
strategic opportunities for key actors in the sector. 
The power purchase issue also illustrates how the APERC reacts to the 
various pressures it faces. In the case of one new generation plant, it 
withstood substantial pressure from the government, informally expressed, 
to considerably lower profit rates and therefore costs to consumers.16 In 
another case, faced with considerable government pressure, the regulator 
was arguably lax about ensuring adequate fuel supply for the plant, and in 
the process allowed the risk of fuel supply to be passed on to the 
consumer, potentially substantially hiking costs.17 The latter case is 
currently under further appeal. The implications of these two cases for the 
regulator’s independence from versus control by the government rest in 
the details of each case. However, that these issues are debated, and that 
any gains are made at all, is almost certainly facilitated by public 
engagement and scrutiny. 
The broadening of regulatory space to include consumers of all sorts, 
public interest groups, and media may yet be the most far reaching change 
brought about by independent regulation. While regulatory governance is 
at an early stage, the AP experience suggests that future developments will 
be well worth exploring. 
In Delhi as in the Andhra Pradesh case, the statutory requirements for 
hearings, access to information and mechanisms of recourse have created 
an important new space for regulatory governance in Delhi. However, the 
weaknesses in the practical application of these procedural requirements 
are also considerable. For example, the DERC website is incomplete and 
                                                 
16Interview with APERC official, 1/5/06. 
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ill-organized, which along with the lack of an effective library or an 
organized index of documents makes accessing documents extremely 
difficult in practice. The hearings are not open to the public, but only to 
those who have submitted comments. This said, the wide availability of 
detailed tariff orders to the public, and the ability of consumers and 
interested parties of all sorts to present their views before the DERC, and 
obtain an answer from the distribution companies, represents an entirely 
new institutional space for public deliberation. 
In 2004-05 the DERC received 212 objections to its tariff orders from 69 
different objectors.18 Consumer groups or individuals accounted for about 
40 of these while there were about 20 objectors from within industrial user 
groups. Of the total concerns expressed, by far the majority, (625 out of 
683) were substantive complaints as compared to more narrow grievances.  
By contrast to Andhra Pradesh, however, no small core of competent and 
knowledge intervenors had appeared to win the respect of the regulators. 
For example, DERC staff says they do not find public submissions helpful 
in improving the quality of tariff orders. And indeed the capacity base of 
intervenors is thin. Thus, the apex body of Delhi's Resident Welfare 
Associations (RWAs) which includes the wide spectrum of 
neighbourhoods, including well to do areas, files petitions based on 
patched together pieces of information, without deploying any resources to 
obtain specialized knowledge or skills.19 Similarly, the Chamber of 
Commerce hires a single consultant to write their comments, with little 
involvement or feedback from the staff, or mechanism of either quality 
control or ensuring that comments truly represent member interests.20   
However, Delhi consumers are extremely active and skilled in the broader 
political arena around electricity. The apex body of RWAs skilfully uses 
the media to directly critique the companies and the DERC and to force 
engagement and consideration of their appeals at the highest political 
levels. While it is an effective tactic in the context of any particular 
skirmish, this approach has the effect of de-valuing and de-legitimizing the 
DERC as a forum for reconciling competing interests.  
                                                 
18Based on analysis conducted by the authors using data in DERC tariff orders. 
19Interview with consumer representative, 20/1/06. 
20Interview with Chamber of Commerce representative, 31/1/06. 




A political mapping of consumer voices in Delhi is also instructive and 
helps explain the emphasis on organized politics rather than on the DERC. 
The most vocal subgroup, the RWAs, speak for a distinct sub-section of 
Delhi's consumers self-identified as “middle class”, but who include the 
top end of Delhi's income strata. They place themselves in opposition to 
small scale and illegal industry owned by local politicians and slum 
dwellings which contain those politicians vote banks. Both of these 
categories of consumers, they argue, receive free power at their expense. 
From this perspective, the DERC is relatively helpless; the problem and 
the solution, lies in the political process.  
As a result of the dominance of the RWAs in the public discourse around 
electricity, the issues that have attained the highest profile in the DERC 
are questions of metering and billing and other consumer grievance issues, 
after an initial period when the DERC was seen to be non-responsive. 
Some of the upstream and more technically detailed matters also before 
the regulator, notably investment scrutiny, have tended to be ignored. 
Another important consequence is that voices of lower income groups and 
especially slum dwellers are seldom heard within the DERC process.  
In sum, the effect of creating a new institutional space for regulatory 
governance has had relatively little beneficial effect on the regulatory 
process in Delhi. To the extent there are any substantive wins, they are on 
the issues closest to consumers – metering, billing and grievance redressal. 
The more significant observation is that, if anything, consumer action has 




India is far from being a regulatory state in Majone’s (1994) 
characterization of the shift from public ownership, planning and 
centralized administration to regulation through structuring of incentives 
and signals. Understood as an essential complement to privatization, 
regulation has persisted and multiplied even as efforts at privatization have 
ground to a near halt. Intended as a buffer against political forces to enable 
private participation, regulation has now become an end in itself, the most 
tangible expression of, or even a substitute for political reform.  
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Thus constructed, electricity regulation in India risks being absorbed and 
accommodated within the existing political-bureaucratic system, with very 
little impact on decision making. The creation of separate agencies has 
introduced an element of transparency in decision making, but the impact 
of this is reduced by the embedding of the process within well worn 
networks. The signaling and credibility functions are muted by the 
overarching control of the political process. At root, the pattern of decision 
making in the sector is only transformed if there is a sustained political 
impetus to change. The only way beyond this dependence on the 
favourable alignment of larger political forces on a state by state basis is 
through re-conceptualizing regulation as a new political space, an intent 
quite removed from the original designers of electricity regulation. In 
other words, since the problem of electricity in India is at root a political 
problem – unchecked state control – the way out lies not in institutional 
design, but in the explicitly political solution of new, democratic and 
legitimate regulatory spaces.  
The Indian electricity example also suggests considerable diversity in 
outcome at which two cases can only hint. It reinforces the importance of 
understanding historical timing, bureaucratic traditions and customs, and 
organizational attributes. In India, the story is particularly bound up with 
understanding the shifting nature of the state. An inductive approach to 
regulation would appear necessary to fully sketch out the character of 
regulatory spaces.  
At the same time, the Indian experience does suggest some systematic 
influences that come into play when independent regulation is introduced 
to developing countries. I conclude this paper with a short discussion of 
two of these themes, which might be taken to the study of regulation in 
other parts of the developing world. 
Attention to the role of donor agencies as vectors of institutional 
isomorphism may be a fruitful line of inquiry in many developing 
countries. The often uncritical acceptance of regulatory institutions as part 
of a package deal also comes with a lack of reflection on the role of 
regulation as a shaper of politics, other than the unchallenged assumption 
that regulation can make politics less relevant. That regulators are often 
introduced as part of donor driven and defined agendas may homogenize 
regulatory experience in some respects, and mute the impact of historical 
timing and geographic specificity. 




Finally, the Indian experience suggests that attention the potential for 
regulation to be conceived of as a new and democratic political space – is 
worth exploring. Regulatory governance in developing countries brings 
the challenge of weak and under-resourced civil society and possibly an 
over-bearing state with little regard for procedural safeguards. However, in 
the context of other weak and illegitimate public institutions, regulation 
has the benefit of being a newcomer without the baggage of the past. If the 
Indian example proves to be more generally true, the theoretical interest 
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